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Transformation of the Financial Sector in Indonesia1 
Miki Hamada 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The source and deployment of finance are central issues in economic development. Since 
1966, when the Soeharto Administration was inaugurated, Indonesian economic 
development has relied on funds in the form of aid from international organizations and 
foreign countries. After the 1990s, a further abundant inflow of capital sustained a rapid 
economic development. Foreign funding was the basis of Indonesian economic growth. 
This paper will describe the mechanism for allocating funds in the Indonesian economy. 
It will identify the problems this mechanism generated in the Indonesian experience, and 
it will attempt to explain why there was a collapse of the financial system in the wake of 
the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997. 
 
History of the Indonesian Financial system 
 
The year 1966 saw the emergence of commercial banks in Indonesia. It can be said that 
before 1966 a financial system hardly existed, a fact commonly attributed to economic 
disruptions like the consecutive runs of fiscal deficit and hyperinflation under the 
Soekarno Administration. After 1996, with the inauguration of Soeharto, a regulatory 
system of financial legislation, e.g. central banking law and banking regulation, was 
introduced and implemented, and the banking sector that is the basis of the current 
financial system in Indonesia was built up. 
The Indonesian financial structure was significantly altered at the first financial 
reform of 1983. Between 1966 and 1982, the banking sector consisted of Bank Indonesia 
(the Central Bank) and the state-owned banks. There was also a system for distributing 
the abundant public revenue derived from the soaring oil price of the 1970s. The public-
finance distribution function, incorporated in Indonesian financial system, changed after 
the successive financial reforms of 1983 and 1988, when there was a move away from the 
                                                 
1 This Research Paper was originally published in Japanese in March 2002.  
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monopoly-market style dominated by state-owned banks (which was a system of public-
finance distribution that operated at the discretion of the government) towards a modern 
market mechanism. 
 
The five phases of development 
 
The Indonesian financial system developed in five phases between 1966 and the present 
time. The first period (1966-72) was its formative period, the second (1973-82) its policy-
based finance period under soaring oil prices, the third (1983-91) its financial-reform 
period, the fourth (1992-97) its period of expansion, and the fifth (1998-) its period of 
financial restructuring.  
The first section of this paper summarizes the financial policies operative during 
each of the periods identified above. In the second section changes to the financial sector 
in response to policies are examined, and an analysis of these changes shows that an 
important development of the financial sector occurred during the financial reform period. 
In the third section the focus of analysis shifts from the general financial sector to 
particular commercial banks’ performances. In the third section changes in commercial 
banks’ lending and fund-raising behaviour after the 1990s are analysed by comparing 
several banking groups in terms of their ownership and foundation time. The last section 
summarizes the foregoing analyses and examines the problems that remain in the 
Indonesian financial sector, which is still undergoing restructuring. 
 
1. Transition of Policies in the Indonesian Financial Sector 
 
Characteristics of the Indonesian Financial Sector 
 
Before examining its specific policies, it is appropriate to outline the characteristics of the 
Indonesian financial sector: The Indonesian financial sector had been a financial system 
dominated by banking intermediation, or indirect finance. The volume of the Indonesian 
capital market continues to be very small, carrying around 200 listed companies. And 
these companies are not necessarily parallel with Indonesian representative companies. 
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Until the 1980s state-owned banks dominated the banking sector. The financial 
system was able to utilize the abundant funds provided by foreign aid and derived from 
the soaring oil prices of the 1970s. In contrast, the fall in oil prices after the 1980s 
reduced government revenue and caused the economy to become stagnant. In an effort to 
correct this, the Indonesian government cut expenditure, borrowed from private banks, 
floated bonds on the Euro market and took loans from the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and implemented two sets of comprehensive and 
radical financial reforms as part of its structural adjustment policy. 
The liberalization of the capital account in 1970, preceding the financial reforms 
of the 1980s, is a fact worthy of mention. Generally, liberalization of the capital account 
comes last in a sequence of liberalizing moves. However, Indonesia opened its capital 
account very early in that sequence. The Indonesian financial sector is experiencing much 
more serious and acute financial problems in the wake of the Asian currency crisis of 
1997 than are other countries, such as Thailand and Korea that suffered from the crisis. 
Those problems are most evident in the deep depreciation of the home currency (the 
rupiah), in the huge external debts, in the huge amount of non-performing loans, and in 
the enormous net capital deficiency of almost all banks.  
 
1-1. Formative period of Financial Structure, 1966-72 
 
The Indonesian economic system was largely transformed by the administrational change 
from Soekarno to Soeharto. After Soeharto, the administration put an end to 
hyperinflation and economic disorder, and it achieved the restoration of Indonesia to the 
international community. This period, 1966 to 1972, during which the process of the 
development of the economic system and the financial framework of Indonesia became 
subject to systematic scrutiny, is considered to mark the emergence of a financial 
structure. During that time, the Indonesian government tried to slough off the directed 
economic system of the Soekarno era. The government reinstated itself as a member of 
IMF and World Bank took measures to achieve economic stabilization by resolving the 
balance-of-payment crisis in accordance with the IMF’s and the World Bank’s guidance. 
The specific measures were: introduction of the discipline ‘balanced budget’, export 
promotion, utilization of foreign aid for development expenditure, open-door policy to 
IDE Research Paper No. 6, September 2003 
5 
foreign capital, adjustment of foreign exchange rate to proper rate, removal of foreign 
exchange controls. 
The most significant policy was the introduction of the discipline of balanced 
budget. At the end of the Soekarno era, inflation was terribly high: 95% in 1961, 129% in 
1963, and 594% in 1965. Low economic growth and continuous fiscal-deficit expansion 
put the government on an inflation-finance footing. This resulted in hyperinflation 
(Mihira, 1995:195). The Balanced Budget Policy was introduced in order to reduce the 
high inflation rate to normal rate and to reduce the huge fiscal deficit.  
`Balanced budget’, however, means only that total revenue and expenditure are 
balanced. Foreign aid was treated as a part of revenue, (‘development revenue’). That is, 
all foreign aid or development revenue was allotted to government investment or 
development expenditure. In short, the differences between `current revenue’ and `total 
amount expenditure’ were compensated for by foreign aid. This ‘balanced budget’ 
scheme became available after Indonesia’s return to IMF membership. Thanks to that 
return, Indonesia could use the stand-by credit of the IMF. At the same time, the 
government was guided to undertake to keep fiscal deficit under 10 % of revenue. Thus 
the government was able to achieve a balanced budget without central-bank finance and 
to revive its economy with foreign aid. 
 
Structure of the financial sector  
 
The Indonesian financial sector was composed of the commercial-bank sector, the non 
commercial-bank sector and the non bank sector. The commercial bank sector included 
the commercial banks, the development banks, and the savings banks. The non-
commercial bank sector consisted of Bank Perkreditan Rakyat [BPR]. BPR included the 
rural bank (the `rice and paddy bank’), the rural credit bank [LDKP], the non-rural bank 
(market bank, employee bank, the rural production bank [BKPD]), and the new BPR. The 
non-bank sector consisted of pawnshops and the insurance company, Arisan (rural 
informal saving scheme). As of 1968, there were 160 banks in the commercial-bank 
sector: five state-owned banks, one state-owned development bank, one state-owned 
saving bank, 23 regional government-development banks, 122 private commercial banks 
and 8 foreign banks (Table-1). 
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Loans and financial scale 
 
Bank Indonesia’s credits accounted for 30% of the commercial banks’ total loans, and the 
state-owned banks’ for 60%. Private commercial banks, which number was over 120, 
accounted for less than 10%. While rural banks and state-owned pawnshops also supplied 
credit as non-commercial and non-bank institutions, the total amount of their credit was 
less that 2.5% of total lending. In that period state-owned banks dominated the 
Indonesian financial sector. However, 40% of state owned banks’ lending was financed 
by the Central Bank. Consequently, Indonesian commercial bank lending relied heavily 
on Central Bank funds. 
Money supply (M2) accounted for 7.1% of GDP in 1966 and increased to 
12.5% in 1971. The total amount of commercial bank loans, including the Central Bank’s 
loans to commercial banks, was 6.3 billion rupiah in 1966, which was just 2% of GDP. In 
1971 it increased to 495.3 billion rupiah and 13.5% of GDP. This development was 
caused by government efforts to collect savings money by curbing the high inflation rate. 
When the government introduced saving deposit and time deposit schemes in October 
1968, banks were able to utilize the funds of the new deposits as additional funds. 
 
Savings schemes 
 
In 1969 the government introduced new savings schemes continuously. That was a pilot 
project of savings certificates similar to lottery2. Only some limited banks were allowed 
to introduce this scheme, in which the depositor bought certificates for their value or paid 
for them in installments. The government guaranteed both. Every month there was a draw, 
and holders of certificates received winning ticket for the amount of their face value, 
while banks had to pay an amount equivalent to one percent of their turnover to the 
government.  
 
                                                 
2 As of 1 March 1971, the monthly interest rate on certificates of deposit was 1.25% for 3 months, 
1.75% for 6 months and 2.25% for 12 months. 
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Table 1　Changes of Commercial Bank's Indicators, 1965～20
Total
Asset of
All Banks
Total
Lending
of All
Banks/GD
P
Bil of Rp (%)
Lending
ratio
(%)*
No.
of
Banks
**
Lending
ratio
(%)*
No. of
Banks
***
Len
ding
ratio
(%)
*
No.
of
Banks
Lending
ratio
(%)*
No.
of
Banks
1965 2 4.0 64.6 n.a. 13.1 n.a. 0.0 n.a. 0.0 n.a. n.a.
1966 15 2.0 57.5 n.a. 18.7 n.a. 0.0 n.a. 0.0 n.a. n.a.
1967 37 3.7 45.8 7 15.4 121 0.0 23 0.0 n.a. n.a.
1968 119 11.7 56.2 7 7.0 122 0.0 23 1.0 8 160
1969 291 9.0 56.2 7 7.0 122 0.0 23 1.0 11 163
1970 487 10.8 64.3 7 6.8 126 0.0 25 2.3 11 169
1971 659 13.5 69.3 7 6.6 129 0.0 25 3.2 11 172
1972 983 14.4 70.0 7 6.6 126 0.0 26 4.0 11 170
1973 1,533 14.9 72.8 7 6.7 114 0.0 26 5.1 11 158
1974 2,184 14.7 72.2 7 5.7 107 0.0 26 7.4 11 151
1975 2,725 21.8 58.2 7 4.8 97 0.0 26 4.4 11 141
1976 3,509 23.1 56.3 7 5.5 91 0.0 26 4.2 11 135
1977 4,030 21.0 56.8 7 6.4 85 1.3 26 4.6 11 129
1978 5,205 23.7 52.5 7 5.5 83 1.2 26 4.9 11 127
1979 6,789 19.6 52.2 7 6.5 78 1.4 26 5.5 11 122
1980 10,122 17.3 54.6 7 7.2 76 1.8 26 5.3 11 120
1981 13,153 17.5 57.9 7 8.2 75 2.4 26 5.4 11 119
1982 15,957 20.8 61.7 7 9.2 71 2.7 26 5.1 11 115
1983 20,832 19.7 64.0 7 12.3 70 2.7 27 5.6 11 115
1984 27,768 20.9 70.9 7 16.2 69 2.7 27 5.6 11 114
1985 33,658 22.5 69.4 7 18.5 69 2.9 27 4.8 11 114
1986 40,802 23.9 67.4 7 20.9 68 2.9 27 4.6 11 114
1987 48,202 25.5 66.0 7 22.7 67 2.9 27 4.3 11 112
1988 63,284 29.5 65.1 7 24.3 66 2.7 27 4.3 11 111
1989 93,024 35.4 62.2 7 29.2 91 2.6 27 4.9 23 148
1990 132,623 46.3 54.8 7 35.8 109 2.4 27 6.3 28 171
1991 153,239 45.4 52.7 7 36.8 129 2.3 27 7.5 29 192
1992 180,148 43.8 55.2 7 34.2 144 2.4 27 7.5 30 208
1993 213,959 45.6 47.6 7 40.2 161 2.4 27 9.8 39 234
1994 248,061 59.3 35.3 7 38.0 166 ### 27 8.1 40 240
1995 308,618 51.6 39.8 7 47.6 165 2.2 27 10.3 41 240
1996 387,477 55.0 37.2 7 51.2 164 2.2 27 9.4 41 239
1997 528,875 60.2 40.5 7 44.6 144 2.0 27 12.9 44 222
1998 762,428 38.9 45.3 7 39.7 130 1.3 27 13.7 44 208
1999 789,356 20.3 49.9 5 24.9 92 3.0 27 22.2 49 173
2000 984,500 20.8 37.9 5 30.6 81 3.8 26 27.7 52 164
Source : Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics , various issues.
Note**: Including one private development bank and two private saving banks.
Note***: Including one state development bank and one state saving bank.
Numbe
r of
Banks
Note*: Ratio of each banks' lending amount to all commercial banks' total lending.
Difference between sum of percentage in the above table and 100% is equivalent to
the central bank lending.
State Owned
Bank
Private National
Bank
Regional
Governme
nt Bank
Foreign/Joint
Bank
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In August 1971 the saving scheme was taken over by National Development 
Saving, Tabungan Pembangnan Nasional [Tabanas] and Time Insurance Saving, 
Tabungan Asuransi Berjangka [Tsaka]. Tabanas offered an 18%3 annual interest rate. 
Depositors were in line for winning the `lottery’, of which the first prize was 10,000 
rupiah per bank-balanced of 1,000 rupiah. The draw happened once every half-year. 
Taska was an insurance deposit sponsored by banks and insurance companies. 
Members put a certain amount of money in the bank – a minimum of 100 rupiah. In case 
of fatal accident their beneficiaries could immediately collect on the insurance equivalent 
of 13 months. Or, having deposited twelve times, members could collect an equivalent in 
money of 13 months of insurance at 15% annual interest rate. 
These, like other newly-introduced saving schemes that offered high interest 
rates in order to mobilize domestic funds, generated a negative spread among banks. 
However, the government reimbursed the negative spread with subsidies. For example, it 
subsidized the interest-rate costs of commercial banks until May 1969 for these saving 
schemes. From October 1968 the Central Bank subsidized one-third of the interest-rate 
costs of state owned banks for six-month and twelve-month time-deposits. In March 1969, 
this subsidy was changed to 1% for twelve-month time-deposits only, and it was 
abolished altogether in May 1969. 
 
Analysis 
 
It can be concluded that the financial sector during this period was not independent. 
Indeed, it could be called a government subsidiary, because banking capital was financed 
by the Central Bank and the government. But it is undeniable that in this period the 
Indonesian financial system was transformed, given its ability, as a result of the 
termination of high inflation, to implement balanced budget and savings schemes.  
This period was also a time of reform in the exchange-rate system. In 1967 the 
government consolidated and centralized a foreign exchange market, then a rupiah-
                                                 
3 In May 1972, in accordance with the decrease in time-deposit interest rates of state banks, the 
following annual interest rates were adopted: 18% for less than 100 thousands rupiah outstanding, 
12% for more than 100 thousands rupiah outstanding. In 1973 these interest rates decreased to 15% 
and 9% respectively, and interest-rate tax was abolished. 
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exchange market, these having previously been several separate markets. In this period, 
there were four kinds of foreign exchange: 
 
(i) Export Compensation Foreign Exchange (Devisa Bonus Ekspor); 
(ii) Aid Foreign Exchange (Devisa Bantuan: mainly used for commodity aid);  
(iii) Compensation Foreign Exchange (Devisa Pelengkap: compensated for the 
difference between government standard price and exporter price); 
(iv) Automatic Allocation Foreign Exchange (Alokasi Devisa Otomatis, which 
is foreign exchange, of which a certain proportion of export amount is 
allocated to regional government.). 
 
In the beginning of 1970, Automatic Allocation Foreign Exchange was 
abolished, then in April 1970 Export Compensation Foreign Exchange and Compensation 
Foreign Exchange integrated as General Foreign Exchange. Thus foreign exchange was 
of two kinds: General Foreign Exchange and Aid Foreign Exchange. In this instance the 
government set a limit on foreign exchange transaction concerning export and import, 
and it abolished other restrictions concerning any other foreign exchange transaction 
(Government regulation No 6, 1970). The effect of this was that Indonesia abolished 
foreign-exchange control at a very early stage of the formation of its financial system.  
 
1-2. Period of Policy-based Finance under Soaring Oil Prices: 1973-82 
 
The structure of the banking sector, with the Central Bank and the state-owned banks at 
its core, was established during the previous period. During the period 1973-1982, 
policies introduced in the previous period found structural expression in the financial 
system: Interest rates in some priority sectors (like rice or other grain in the agricultural 
sector) were set at very low levels, which caused real interest rates to register in the 
negative. It can be said that this period typified a regime of financial repression. The 
government attempted to increase financial deepening. To this end, it set deposit rates at 
relatively high levels. The gap between the high deposit rates and the lending rate was 
compensated by subsidies. Abundant oil revenue made this mechanism possible. As 
Binhadi explained during the period 1973 to 1982, the combination of a non-self-
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sustaining financial structure and abundant oil money led the financial sector into a 
condition of dependence on the government: 
 
Monetary policy before 1983 was characterized by the provision of Bank 
Indonesia liquidity credit which was mainly supported by the oil boom (Binhadi 
[1995:13]). 
 
In April 1974 the government announced a monetary tightening, the `Package in 
April 1974’, to cope with the rising inflation rate. In line with it, the government capped 
the credit available to banks and offered them all a `liquidity fund’ from which they could 
lend at low rates of interest. In addition to and in accordance with its development policy, 
the Central Bank extended direct credit to important industries. That direct credit, 
however, was financed also by oil revenue. 
Since September 1957 banks had been obliged to maintain a reserve ratio of 
30% in rupiah liquidity liability. The ratio was reduced to 15% in December 1977. From 
April 1974 up to 10% of banks’ current liability which was deposited with the Central 
Bank was eligible for an annual interest-rate payment of 10%. After December 1977 this 
`reserve ratio’ eligibility for payment was increased to 15% for current liability, but the 
interest rate was decreased to 6% per annum. 
Although variation of the reserve ratio is an important instrument of monetary 
policy, definitions of `reserve’ and `current liability’ were often changed, depending on 
each monetary policy and type of commercial bank (state owned, private, foreign). 
Therefore, even though the formal reserve ratio remained constant, effective reserve ratio 
departed from it. Thus `reserve ratio’ in this context is not a suitable gauge of the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. 
In 1976 there was a presidential decree to the effect that the capital market had 
to be upgraded. The design in this was to bring foreign capital into the domestic capital 
market. In response to the decree, the stock exchange, which had been closed since 1968, 
reopened in 1977. In anticipation of this, in 1976 the government had set up three 
institutions charged with developing the capital market: the Committee of Capital Market 
Policy, the Capital Market Supervision Agency [BAPEPAM], and the state-owned 
underwriting company, Danareksa. 
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1-3. Period of Financial Reform: 1983-91 
 
A sharp decline in oil prices in 1982 affected government revenue and its balance of 
payments, which had relied heavily on revenue from oil export. To meet this exigency, 
the government tried to work out a structural adjustment policy. In order to turn the 
economy away from heavy reliance on oil revenue, it devalued the rupiah and 
implemented deregulation and liberalization policies. Financial liberalization, taken as a 
series of liberalization policies, aimed to move toward a predominantly market based 
financial system (Wardhana, 1995: 80). 
The comprehensive financial reforms of 1983 radically altered the previous 
financial infrastructure that had been managed by the government through the Central 
Bank and the state owned banks. The financial reform and the second reform of 1988 
transferred Indonesia’s fund allocation principle, with deregulation and liberalization at 
the core, from the government to the market. In 1991 the government turned its attention 
to prudential regulation and it started to pay close attention to soundness in banking 
practice. A regulatory system was designed and implemented during this period. 
 
Details of specific policies 
 
In June 1983 a financial reform package that proposed the complete liberalization of 
interest rates on deposits and credit of state-owned banks (except those of Bimas4 and 
small-investment finance) was endorsed by the Cabinet. The interest rates of Tabanas 
(savings deposit) were increased, and bank-loan ceiling was abolished. The 20% of 
taxation on interest earned on foreign-currency deposits on domestic market was also 
abolished. 
In next February 1984, the Central Bank Certification [Sertifikat Bank 
Indonesia: SBI] and the Discount Facility [Fasilitas Diskonto] were introduced. SBI 
aimed to liquidate current short-term funds among commercial banks, while Fsasilitas 
Dikonto aimed to supply credit to private commercial banks facing tight liquidities. 
                                                 
4 BIMAS had a policy to self-sufficiency in rice and a commitment to using high-yields seeds, 
chemical fertilizer, agrochemical, and to arranging finance for agriculture. It was called 
BIMAS/INMAS: Bimbingan Massal/ Intensifikasi Massal). 
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In April 1984, monetary policy was eased: The Central Bank decreased discount 
rates from 17.5% to 16.5%. Interest rates at SBI were also decreased from 15% to 14%. 
Furthermore, the payment period of preferential loans from the Central Bank to state-
owned banks and regional development banks was extended and the interest rates were 
decreased by 1%. The settlement period of inter-bank interest rates was extended from 
seven to ninety days. 
In September 1984, the Central Bank set a ceiling on inter-bank borrowing of 
7.5% of total amount of rupiah deposit in order to stabilize and improve inter-bank 
transactions. Alternately, the Central Bank offered to advance special liquidities to banks 
faced with shortage of funds. The interest on that was set at 26% per annum. The 
discount rate was increased from 16.5% per annum to 26%. The government also 
changed the frequency of Central Bank Certificate issues from once-a-week to three-
times-a-week, with the view of adjusting increases in money supply in a context of 
expanding credit. 
In October 1988, the government announced a banking-sector reform policy-
package, Paket 27 Oktober 1988 [Pakto], as the second financial reform. Comprehensive 
reforms in the financial system were decided in accordance with it. One of its important 
provisions was the abolishing of restriction on the establishment of new private banks. 
The establishing of new private banks had been prohibited in 1968, but thanks to 
deregulation, that was liberalized to the extent that the only precondition that newly 
admitted bank’s paid-up capital was 10 billion rupiah. In addition to that the nationwide 
opening of new branches of existing banks was also liberalized. The precondition for 
such openings was that the previous 24 months’ business performance was good, or the 
previous 20 months’ performance was good and the remainder months’ at least sound. 
The terms of dealing for foreign-exchange banks was eased too, requiring only 
that the previous 24 months’ financial condition was good and that total asset exceeded 
100 billion rupiah. At the same time, foreign banks were admitted into the Indonesian 
banking business5. (That had been prohibited since 1968.) However, their admission was 
conditional: newly-admitted banks had to form a partnership with a domestic private 
                                                 
5 Previously, only ten foreign bank branches and Bank Perdania (joint bank with Daiwa bank) were 
admitted. 
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bank, and they had to extend their credit to the export-credit equivalent of 50% of the 
total outstanding credit. 
Private banks became available for establishing development banks, and 
cooperatives for establishing ordinary commercial banks and development banks. The 
preconditions were that private development banks’ paid up capital be more than 10 
billion rupiah, and in case of cooperatives, that the sum of their basic investment funds 
and obligate investment funds be more than 10 billion rupiah. Existing savings banks and 
people-credit banks also were admitted to change their status as ordinary commercial or 
development banks if they were able to fulfill the foregoing conditions. New-branch 
opening by non-bank financial institution was deregulated too. In the second financial 
reform, in addition to the removal of the barriers against entering the banking business, 
the terms for the issue of certificates of deposit were eased. Thus savings deposits, 
including national development savings, started to be handled by all banks. 
In the wake of the second financial reform, the number of domestic private 
banks rose from 66 in 1988 to 166 in 1994. New joint banks with foreign banks also 
increased steadily after1989. Their number reached 40, which was 3.6 times the number 
of those in existence in 1989. 
In keeping with the increase in the number of banks, the total-loan amount also 
increased. Table-1 shows the ratio of total-loan amount to GDP. It shows also the ratio of 
state owned banks’ and private banks’ loan-amount to the total of all banks’ loan amount. 
The table notes that banks’ loan amounts, especially private banks, had increased rapidly 
after 1989. 
Underpinning deregulation was guidance from the World Bank and IMF, which 
aimed to introduce competitive principles into the financial sector and to improve 
management effectiveness in the banking and non-banking sectors. Due to Pakto, state-
owned enterprises and regional government enterprises were allowed to deposit to private 
banks and to non-financial institutions. However, deposit to private or non-financial 
institutions was limited to 50% of total deposit, and deposit per bank to 20% of total 
deposit. 
Alongside deregulation, the second financial reform provided for the prudential 
regulation for sound banking management. That limited the extending of credit. After the 
currency crisis, group lending became a serious problem and the existence of group 
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lending limitation was highlighted. Pakto in1988 had already stipulated that the Legal 
Lending Limit [LLL] to a debtor is 20% of the capital of the lending bank or financial 
institution, and to a debtors’ group 50% of capital. Furthermore, there was a lending limit 
of 10% of capital to the stakeholders of a bank or non-bank institution, 25% to and 
stakeholder’s corporate group, 5% to auditors-not-stake-holders and to corporation 
owned by auditors. In addition, there were limitations on lending to board members, 
auditors and families of stakeholders (Central Bank directors determination, No21/51, 
1988). 
 
Analysis 
 
After the second financial reform the financial sector gained momentum for expansion. 
As result, money supply (M2) increased rapidly, as did the total amount of banks’ lending 
and size of deposit. As the domestic economy also became active, domestic and foreign 
investment increased in line with the increase in domestic and foreign investment and 
investment in the real-estate sector. The expansion of investment in real estate might have 
been the result of abundant liquidity from the expansion of the banking sector and from 
the general prosperity of the domestic economy. 
 
Figure 1　Changes in Interest Rate, 1970-97
0
5
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(%)
Call Money
Interest Rate of 6M Time deposit
Interest Rate of Investment Capital
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
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Increase in real-estate investment is prone to increase in bank’s non-performing 
loans. Therefore the government organized a policy package for sound banking in 
February 1991. After 1983 the center of policies for the financial sector was 
‘deregulation’, but in 1988 the Bank for International Settlements [BIS] set up the 
international standard of capital adequacy ratio [CAR] for banking soundness. This 
international movement encouraged Indonesian financial policy to embrace measures for 
the maintenance of banking soundness, like the strengthening of capital-adequacy ratio. 
So 1991 saw the tightening of monitory policy. As a result, deposit interest-rates for 6 
months increased to 23.3% form 17.5% in previous year, and working capital interest-
rates also increased 25.5% from 20.8% (Figure1). 
 
1-4. Period of financial expansion: 1992-97 
 
In response to the changes of circumstance in the banking sector, the governments passed 
Government Regulation No. 7, which required that banking management, like owners 
and managers, follow government guidelines. Furthermore, the government raised banks’ 
minimum capital from 10 billions rupiah to 50 billions rupiah for commercial banks, and 
from 50 billion rupiah to 100 billion rupiah for foreign joint banks. Thus in contrast with 
the previous period, there was considerable emphasis on the supervisory function of the 
government and of the Central Bank with regard to commercial banks.  
However, the government eventually eased some prudential regulations, like 
those concerning rating and the capital-adequacy ratio, because they were widely 
condemned as excessively burdensome for banks. On the other hand, in order to 
strengthen sound banking management, the government enforced observation of the 
Legal Lending Limit and the provision concerning non-performing loans. The banking 
sector saw several shifts of the policy axis during this period. 
Due to tightening monetary policy in 1991, increase in non-performing loans 
became a problem mainly for state-owned banks, and some concrete measures for the 
disposal of non-performing loan were considered. The Central Bank started to emphasize 
the necessity of strengthening the accounting system and the legal system for achieving 
the settlement of non-performing loan. At the same time, the Central Bank recognized an 
obligation to direct 20% of the total lending fund to small and medium-size industries in  
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order to support the funding side of the government’s development policy and poverty-
reduction policy.6  
 After 1992, the effects of the second financial reform continued. The number of 
banks and the amount of total loans continued to increase and it was concerned that 
increase in these areas tended to foment speculative investment. In November 1992, Bank 
Summa’s7 operation was suspended because increase in non-performing loans led it into 
financial trouble. This context manifests the paradigm case of banking sector run into the 
ground by non-performing loans. 
 In the light of the prudential regulation included in Pakto, the government 
attended carefully to the capital-adequacy ratio, to group lending and to the loan-deposit 
ratio. Nevertheless, because of the deregulation of foreign investment in 1994, expansion 
of the financial sector gained momentum. The vast deregulations concerning foreign 
investment were the following: 
 
(i) 100% foreign capital participation was allowed without conditions; 
(ii)  minimum investment limitations were abolished; 
(iii) the admission-to-extension business period was set at more than thirty 
years; 
(iv) the localization regulation, which had been required for the purpose of 
increasing Indonesian local capital by more than half after a certain period, 
was suspended. 
 
In step with deregulation, private capital inflow increased by 2.7 times from 3.7 
billion US dollar in 1994 to 10.3 billon in 1995 (Table-2). These capital inflows were 
mainly foreign direct investment and portfolio investment. 
Total amount of loan and the ratio of total loan to GDP also had increased 
rapidly after 1994. The expansion was mainly absorbed by private national banks. As a 
                                                 
6 For evaluating a bank’s soundness, a score system of financial indicators was adopted. Since lending 
to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) was a bonus point, there is a possibility that banks, in quest 
of a high score, became prone to easy lending to SMEs. (Takeda, 1999: 196). 
 
7 Edward Seky Soeryadjaya, eldest son of Willian Soeryadjaya, owner of Astra Group, owned Bank 
Summa. His bankruptcy was brought about by a rapid increase in non-performing loans accumulated 
by massive group lending (IDE, eds,1992). 
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result, private national banks surpassed state-owned banks in total assets and total loan 
amounts. On the other hand, excess capital inflow shifted the primary industry for bank 
lending from the manufacturing sector to the service sector, which was construction and 
real estate. Then over-lending to specific sectors became a concern. 
 
Table 2  Changes in Capital Account, 1960-2000 (Mil of US$）
Capital
Account
Private
Capital
Balance
Public
Capital
Balance
Errors
and
Omission
Capital
Account
Private
Capital
Balance
Public
Capital
Balance
Errors
and
Omission
1960 183 20 163 -3 1981 2,111 148 1,963 -2,069
1961 354 -11 365 -1 1982 5,756 1,639 4,117 -2,229
1962 120 11 109 -40 1983 6,602 1,826 4,776 494
1963 123 10 113 -37 1984 3,622 757 2,865 -709
1964 128 25 103 14 1985 1,807 68 1,739 238
1965 271 18 253 -35 1986 4,365 1,291 3,074 -810
1966 174 50 124 -9 1987 3,652 1,548 2,104 -173
1967 341 100 241 -30 1988 2,372 407 1,965 -1,141
1968 279 45 234 -4 1989 3,090 314 2,776 -1,439
1969 346 64 282 50 1990 4,746 4,113 633 593
1970 416 103 313 -6 1991 5,829 4,410 1,419 -230
1971 473 156 317 -95 1992 6,471 5,359 1,112 -1,606
1972 805 427 378 58 1993 5,962 5,219 743 -2,923
1973 1,054 498 556 76 1994 4,008 3,701 307 -242
1974 978 382 596 -314 1995 10,589 10,253 336 -2,313
1975 285 -1,493 1,778 -104 1996 10,989 11,511 -522 1,264
1976 1,869 237 1,632 -55 1997 2,542 -338 2,880 -1,651
1977 1,325 -72 1,397 -233 1998 -3,875 -13,846 9,971 2,122
1978 1,824 333 1,491 -566 1999 -4,569 -9,922 5,353 2,079
1979 1,114 -611 1,725 -566 2000 -6,773 -9,990 3,217 3,822
1980 1,574 -630 2,204 -2,057
Source : Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics , various issues.  
 
 
1-5. Period of financial restructuring: 1998 to present time 
 
During the financial expansion period, the government recognized the increase in non-
performing loan and the importance of sound banking management. Nevertheless, there 
was no means of improving the situation because it was happening in a time of rapid 
financial expansion. Then the Asian currency crisis occurred in July 1997. As a first 
remedy measure, the government closed sixteen private national banks in November 
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1997. Since those closures were executed without the provision of a safety net (like 
deposit insurance), the Indonesian banking sector was in complete turmoil. In addition to 
that, the political turbulence of 1988 led the home currency, rupiah, into deep devaluation. 
The devaluation hit companies’ performance, many of them holding debts in US dollars, 
then banks’ non-performing loan increased at a burst. In March 1999, the average non-
performing loan ratio of all commercial banks rose to 58.7% (Table-3). In addition, 
expansion of liabilities in foreign currency deteriorated banks’ balance sheets, with 
almost all banks carrying an excess of debt (Table-4). 
 
Table 3    Changes in Non-performing Loan Ratio, 1996～2000
（％）
1996.3 1997.3 1998.3 1999.3 1999.1 2000.1
All Commercial Banks 10.6 9.3 19.8 58.7 32.8 18.8
State owned bank 16.6 14.2 24.2 47.5 n.a. n.a.
Private forex bank 4.0 4.4 12.8 76.9 n.a. n.a.
Private non-forex bank 14.7 16.5 19.9 38.9 n.a. n.a.
Joint bank 7.4 7.7 25.3 64.6 n.a. n.a.
Foreign bank 2.8 2.7 24.4 49.9 n.a. n.a.
Regional development bank 18.5 13.9 15.8 17.0 n.a. n.a.
Source : Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics , various issues.
Note: After December 1999, individual banks' figures not available due to change of
publication method.  
 
Table 4   Equity Capital / Total Assets, 1995～2000 （％）
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
All Commercial Banks 9.8 9.6 8.8 -12.9 -2.7 5.1
 State owned bank 8.8 9.6 6.8 -8.4 -4.5 3.7
 Private national bank 10.0 9.0 10.3 -13.6 -3.5 6.5
 Foreign bank 8.5 8.0 4.6 3.0 1.0 0.9
 Joint bank 14.7 16.1 11.6 -6.5 9.9 14.2
 Regional development ban 9.5 10.3 10.6 10.4 10.8 9.3
Source : Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics , various issues.  
 
As an emergency measure, the Central Bank gave a liquidity support (Bantuan 
Likuiditas Bank Indonesia [BLBI]) of 164.5 trillion rupiah to fifty-six banks in order to 
cope with the run on banks after the closure of sixteen banks in November 1997. As a 
move towards comprehensive bank restructuring, the Central Bank closed several non-
performing banks and selected some important banks in order to eventually set them at 
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the center of the Indonesian banking system. The restructuring of the banking system was 
implemented with a focus on these selected core banks. The selection was based on the 
examination by international audit firms of 166 banks in 1998. 
In keeping with the result of that examination, the Central Bank divided 
commercial banks into three categories on the basis of their Capital Adequacy Ratio 
[CAR]: Category A had a CAR of more than 4%, Category B of -25% to 4%, Category C 
of under 25% (Takeda, 2000: 205). The government considered Category A banks sound, 
so they were not subjected to restructuring. Category B banks became the main subjects 
of restructuring. Category C banks had to increase their capital to –25% during the 
moratorium period of thirty days in order to become eligible for participating in the 
government’s restructuring program. Seven state-owned banks were in Category C, but 
because of their size and importance, all were bailed out.  
 The banks subjected to restructuring were re-capitalized by government bonds 
to increase their CAR to 4%, and they shifted their non-collectable credits to the Asset 
Management Unit of Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency [IBRA]. In May 1988 the 
first re-capitalization was implemented in twenty-three banks8. As a condition of re-
capitalization, a bank or the bank’s owners had to pay 20% of capital to fulfill the 4% of 
CAR. Where a bank was unable to fulfill that condition, it was nationalized. 
By December 2000, a total of 430.4 trillion rupiah was injected into the banking 
sector. As a result of restructuring, sixty-eight banks were closed (including one in 2001), 
thirteen were nationalized, twenty-seven were re-capitalized, four state-owned banks 
were merged into one new state-owned bank (Bank Mandiri), one nationalized bank was 
merged with Bank Central Asia [BCA], and eight nationalized banks were merged to 
become Bank Danamon. Thus Indonesian banks were drastically reshuffled. Furthermore, 
the IMF imposed the condition that all commercial banks reach 8% of CAR by the end of 
2001. Because it was unable to meet this regulation, Uni Bank was closed in November 
2001 and a further five banks’ merger was decided upon9. 
                                                 
8 Breakdown: 7 private banks (Bank International Indonesia [BII], Lippo, Universal, Bukopin, Prima 
Express, Arta Media, Patriot); 4 nationalized banks (Danamon, Tiara Asia, PDFCI, Bank Central Asia) 
and 12 regional government banks. 
9 Merger of Five Banks: Bali, Bank Universal, Bank Prima Express, Bank Arta Media and Bank 
Patriot, was fixed. Bank Bali is a recapitalized and nationalized bank. The other four banks are 
recapitalized banks. The CAR of all of them except Bank Bali’s was lower than 8%. Bank Bali was at 
11.9% as of June 2001, Bank Universal at 4.1%, Bank Prima Express at 6.5%, Bank Patriot’s and 
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At the same time bankruptcy law was enacted in order to encourage the disposal 
of non-performing loan and liquidation10. In May 1999 the central banking law was also 
amended. 11  This secured the independence of the Central Bank. Pursuant of that 
amendment, the provision of credit to agriculture, housing and small and medium 
enterprises, which used to be handled by Central Bank, was shifted to other institutions. 
The Central Bank was no longer required to supply direct credit to these sectors. The 
banking-supervision function of the Central Bank was also to be transferred to a new 
supervisory body that would be established by 2003. Thus the Central Bank’s function 
moved from fiscal distribution to guarding the stability of exchange rates and to devising 
monetary policy. 
 
 
2. The Financial Market’s Response to Financial Policies 
 
In the previous section, the process of transformation of the banking system was 
summarized as the change from a system that consisted of Central Bank and government 
control of credit through state-owned banks to a modern system based on market 
mechanism. This section will examine how the financial market responded to the 
financial policies introduced to bring about the transformation. 
 
Capital inflow 
 
Capital inflow to Indonesia consisted of public capital and private capital. Since 
Indonesia adopted the balanced-budget principle in 1967, a prerequisite of foreign aid, 
the volume of public capital inflow was decided by the Consultative Group on Indonesia 
[CGI].12 Thus public capital inflow was not influenced in principle by economic policy 
and/or the social situation. Even so, private capital inflow fluctuated in response to 
changes in the political and/or economic situation (Table-2). There were five clearly-
                                                                                                                                                 
Bank Arta Media’s CAR were unknown (21 November, 2001, Jakarta Post).  
10 Acting Government Regulation About Amendment of Bankruptcy Law, No1, 1998, and low No. 4, 
1998 
11 Act for Bank Indonesia No. 23, 1999 
12 After the withdrawal of Holland as a chair country, IGGI changed to CGI and was 
chaired by the World Bank. 
IDE Research Paper No. 6, September 2003 
21 
discernible changes in the volume of private-capital inflow between 1966 and 2000. The 
first occurred at the deregulation of foreign-exchange management in 1970, the second at 
the liberalization of interest rates in 1983, the third at the liberalization of entry into the 
domestic banking business in 1988, the forth at the liberalization of foreign investment in 
1994, and the fifth during the Asian currency crisis of 1977. 
After the deregulation of the foreign-exchange management in 1970, private 
capital inflow increased in line with the rise in private foreign direct investment in 1972 
and 1973. But in 1975, 1.5 billion US dollars, four times the previous year’s amount, 
went out from Indonesia. This happened in consequence of the Pertamina Crisis. The 
government paid Pertamina’s, a state-owned oil company, 1.5 billion US dollars in short-
term debt due in 1975 out of its total debts 2.3 billion US dollars on behalf of Pertamina. 
In the same year the government received 1.78 billion US dollars of public capital in 
order to avoid an expansion of its fiscal deficit, with the result that the capital account in 
1975 had a surplus of 285 million US dollars. 
Between 1975 and 1981, private capital inflow fluctuated within a short 
parameter. It must be noted that there was no interruption of the volume of public capital 
inflow after Indonesia’s receipt of 1.78 billion US dollars in 1975. While private capital 
inflow could not have been expected during the period when the official interest rates of 
state-owned banks were set by the government and real interest rates were in the negative. 
On the contrary, in 1982 private capital inflow increased rapidly to1.6 billion rupiah, an 
eleven-fold improvement upon that of the previous year.  
In 1983, when the first financial reform was implemented, 1.8 billion US dollars 
of private capital flowed in. But in 1985 that inflow decreased to 68 million US dollars, 
and thereafter it became volatile. After 1990 private capital inflow developed a 
`continuous increase’ trend. In that year the amount of inflow reached 4.1 billion US 
dollars; in the previous year it had been 300 million US dollars. The upward trend was 
maintained in subsequent years. Because of the foreign-investment liberalization in 1994 
and the investment boom in East Asian countries, between 1995 and 1996 more than 10 
billion US dollars came into Indonesia. A total of 25 billion US dollars flowed in during 
the three years until preceding 1997, when capital inflow reversed to outflow. Then, 
between 1997 and 1999, an almost-equivalent total, 24 billion US dollars, went out. 
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Capital flow and the development of the financial sector 
 
Figure 2 shows that the ratio of money supply to GDP had increased continuously since 
the beginning of the 1980s, so financial deepening increased. Figure 3 shows that lending 
also increased proportionately with the increase in the amount of deposit. Especially after 
the mid-1980s, both deposit and lending rapidly expanded. We can see that after the crisis, 
though deposit levels were still high, lending decreased rapidly. 
 
Figure 2　Money Supply/GDP, 1965-2000
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           Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics, various issues. 
 
Changes in the structure of assets and liabilities 
 
After the modernization of the foreign-exchange system in 1967 and the abolition of 
foreign exchange controls in 1970, assets and liabilities in foreign currency increased. In 
1967, assets in foreign currency accounted for 0.8% of total assets, but increased to 
18.3% in 1968. Liability in foreign currency also increased from 0.7% to 18% of total 
assets. After the first financial reform, due to the liberalization of interest rates, the ratio 
of time deposit to total assets increased from 15.6% in 1982 to 22.5% in 1983. After the 
second reform in 1988, the liberalization of conditions for entering the domestic banking 
business accelerated a rise in time deposits and of lending to the private sector. Loans to 
the private sector accounted for 61.5% of total assets in 1988, up from 49.4% in 1983, 
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and time deposit also increased to 33.1%. Assets and liabilities in foreign currency 
increased after 1998 also, but that was due to the depreciation of the rupiah. 
Figure3 Changes in Deposit and Lending,
1965-2000
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Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics, various issues. 
 
Figure 4  Changes in Structure of Deposits, 1965～2000
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99
(%)
Demand Deposit
Saving/Time Deposit
Foreign Currency
Deposit
Abolition of forex
management
Interest rate liberalization
Liberalization of enter
bank busibess
Liberalization of
foreign investment
Currency Crisis
  
Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics, various issues. 
 
IDE Research Paper No. 6, September 2003 
24 
Figure 4 shows changes in the structure of demand deposits, savings and time 
deposits and foreign currency deposits. Savings deposits and time deposits were formally 
introduced in 1968, before which demand deposits had been the dominant bank deposit. 
Foreign currency deposit started to increase after the abolition of foreign-exchange 
controls in 1970. Until the mid-1970s, demand deposits and saving/time deposits were of 
the same volume, but after the latter half of 1970s, the volume of saving/time deposits 
decreased. Although the government had set long-term interest rates at high levels in 
order to encourage mobilization of funds, demand deposits seem to have been preferred: 
people valued liquidity more than higher interest rates in a financial market that was not 
yet fully liberalized. 
Due to the financial reforms of 1983, discretion concerning the setting of 
interest rates was shifted from the government to individual banks. Because of that, state-
owned banks’ interest rates, which dominated 80% of total deposit in banking sector, 
impacted on market-deposit rates, causing deposit-interest rates to rise. For example, 
interest rates on one-year deposits increased from 9% to19%. This increase mobilized 
funds to time deposit, and thus the volume of saving/time deposit became much greater 
than that of demand deposits. After 1988 saving/time deposit grew rapidly, and in the 
1990s, foreign deposits surpassed demand deposits. 
 
Table 5 Changes in Composition of Total Assets by Group of Ban
1987～2000
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
All commercial banks 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
State owned bank* 64.7 63.0 54.8 48.7 50.9 51.8 47.0
Private national bank** 21.9 24.0 31.9 36.2 38.2 36.8 41.2
Foreign/Joint bank 5.8 5.1 5.5 7.4 8.5 8.4 9.2
Regional development ban 7.7 8.0 7.8 7.7 3.0 2.9 3.1
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
All commercial banks 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
State owned bank* 42.1 39.7 36.5 38.2 40.0 49.6 51.3
Private national bank** 45.9 47.8 51.8 47.0 46.2 36.9 35.6
Foreign/Joint bank 9.5 9.8 9.2 14.2 13.0 13.0 12.5
Regional development ban 3.2 3.2 2.8 2.3 1.9 2.4 2.6
Source : Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics , various issues.
*Including one state development banks and one state saving bank. 
 **Including private development bank and two private saving banks.  
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Analysis 
 
The two financial reforms and the massive capital inflow after the liberalization of 
foreign investment controls promoted the banking sector’s expansion. Private national 
banks developed at a remarkable rate after the mid-1990s. However, after the crisis the 
situation relapse into its pre-liberalization state. Table 5 shows the changes in the total-
assets composition of commercial banks. After 1999 state owned banks’ total assets again 
surpassed private national banks’ assets. In 2000 state-owned banks controlled more than 
half of all commercial banks’ assets. During this harsh time, the banking sector, including 
almost all banks, had negative equity and many private banks were closed. All state-
owned banks were bailed out in order to avoid disorder on the financial market. All state 
banks, including Bank Mandiri, which is the biggest bank forged from the merger of four 
state owned banks, were re-capitalized with 280 trillion rupiah by the government. 
Because uncertainty was mounting in the banking sector, many deposits were shifted for 
safety to state-owned banks or nationalized banks. This is the main reason why state-
owned banks regained the dominant position. Foreign banks’ and joint banks’ volumes 
also increased to more than 10%. This occurred for the same reason that brought about 
the resurgence of state-owned banks: depositor flight to safety. 
 
 
3. Analysis of Commercial Banks’ Financial Indicator 
 
It was demonstrated in the previous section that the liberalization in 1998 of conditions 
for entering the domestic banking business contributed to the quantitative expansion of 
the banking sector. Until the financial reforms, state-owned banks had dominated the 
Indonesian banking sector. After 1994, private national banks surpassed state-owned 
banks, both in total assets and total lending. Since 1994 and until the currency crisis, 
private national banks overtook state-owned banks, with the result that the Indonesian 
banking system came to be considered an effective market in which competitive principle 
functioned. How then did quantitative expansion affect banks’ behavior? And did it 
accompany changes in bank lending or asset-investment practices that were conducive to 
fund raising? 
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It is said that as part of the state of disorder in the banking sector after the 
currency crisis, easy loans made the banking sector vulnerable. And it is pointed out that 
one reason for this vulnerability was the rapid increase in the number of banks in the 
absence of a sufficiency of skilled human capital and competent screening loan skill. 
However, such assertions require careful investigation. Against the assumption that the 
new banks’ management systems were inefficient, there is no ground for claiming that 
banks which had been managed by the government and the Central Bank since 1965 were 
run effectively. Until the crisis, the Indonesian government had a `no bankruptcy of 
banks’ policy. Such a government policy might be seen as one that encourages moral 
hazard in banking management. Notably, during and after the crisis, state-owned banks 
were not closed and but merged, and merger does not necessarily improve effectiveness 
of management. 
 
Table 6　Number of banks by establishment date
Establishment
71 before 1988
117 after 1988
17 before 1988
7 after 1988
54 before 1988
111 after 1988
34 before 1988
33 after 1988
12 before 1988
8 after 1988
39 before 1988
(27)    Forex Bank
(12)    Non-forex
52 after 1988
(18)    Forex Bank
(34)    Non-forex
Source : PT Ekofin Konsulindo, “ Indonesian Banking Indicator and Financial
Performance 31 December 1991–31 December 1999” (CD-ROM).
Note: As of 1999 a number of banks decreased to 91 from 164 in 1997, due to
closures of 67 bank, merger of 6 nationalized-banks. A merger of BCA and Bank
Risjad Salim International(RSI), and Danamon and 8 nationalized-banks were
executed gradually and finished in 2000, so that as of 1999 only 6 banks merger
to Bank Danamon were finished.
Number of restructured banks after 1997 20
Number of banks as of 1999 91*
Number of banks as of 1997 164
Number of closure banks after 1997 67
Number of Banks
Sum of all private national banks in 1990 and
1997
188
Number of banks closed by 1997 24
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In this section, the Indonesian banking sector is examined through a six-part 
categorization of its institutions: state owned banks, regional development banks, private 
national foreign exchange banks (hereafter, ‘forex’), private national non-foreign 
exchange banks (‘non-forex’), joint banks, foreign banks. This examination compares the 
business performance13 of state owned banks, forex banks, non-forex banks and joint 
banks. Findings concerning management and corporate governance in joint banks are 
expected to be different from those concerning national banks because of the formers’ 
foreign capital holdings. On that basis, it is expected that the criteria for evaluating joint 
banks will yield the fair indicators of the comparison study. 
The categories `forex banks’ and ‘non-forex banks’ are further subdivided into 
groups in accordance with their foundation years: `before 1988’ and `after 1988’, in order 
to determine whether differences in banks’ behavior can be attributed to commencement 
before or after the liberalization of 1988. 
After 1988, the rush to establish new banks started. By 1999, 18 of the 45 forex 
banks were established after 1988, as were 34 of 46 non-forex banks. Between 1990 and 
1997 in both periods, there was a total of 188 banks (not including joint banks). Of these, 
24 were closed by 1997. Among the 164 banks still in existence in 1997, 67 were closed 
after the crisis, and the government restructured 20 of them. Table 6 shows the change in 
the number of banks number. 
 
Table 7 Total Assets of Private National Banks
by Establishment Date in 1991, 1994 and 1997 (Mil of Rp）
1991 1994 1997
all banks 39,462,148 74,466,467 184,094,891
per bank 769,999 1,438,772 3,503,261
all banks 3,109,380 9,728,864 29,428,073
per bank 103,646 249,602 747,345
Source : PT Ekofin Konsulindo, "Indonesian Banking Indicator and Financial Performance
          31 December 1991 - 31 December 1999"(CD-ROM), Jakarta, 2000.
after 1988 52
Establishment Number ofbank as of
Total Assets
before 1988 39
 
                                                 
13 The database of Ekofin Konsulindo is used in the analysis. This database holds all commercial 
banks’, including non-listed banks’, half-yearly balance sheets and profit-and-loss assessments from 
1991 to 1999. Though there are discontinuities in its records, this database is the only useful one 
available for a study of the 1990s. 
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Of the 67 banks closed, 34 were set up before 1988, and 12 of the 20 banks 
restructured after the crisis were set up before 1988. This shows that `new banks’ does 
not necessarily imply `badly managed banks’. The significant difference between new 
and old banks was in their sizes. Table 7 shows that the average total asset of old banks in 
1991 was 770 billion rupiah per bank, while new banks’ was 100 billion rupiah per bank, 
or only one-seventh of that of the old banks. Furthermore, comparing forex and non-forex 
banks on growth of total assets between 1991 and 1997, the forex banks show (Table 8) 
the bigger growth in total assets per bank: these assets increased 8.2 times between 1991 
and 1997. Table 8 shows also that during the mid-1990s, the private national banks, 
including the new private national banks, were at the core of the Indonesian banking 
sector’s expansion.  
 
Table 8  Growth Rate of Total Asset of Private National Banks
by Establishment Date in 1991, 1994 and 1997 (Mil of Rp）
Number
of bank
as of
Establish
-ment
date
Total Asset 1991 1994 1997
all banks 38,006,174 71,884,693 180,029,945 4.7 times
per bank 1,407,636 2,662,396 6,667,776 4.7 times
all banks 2,458,781 7,166,421 24,065,276 9.8 times
per bank 163,919 421,554 1,336,960 8.2 times
all banks 1,455,974 2,581,774 4,064,946 2.8 times
per bank 132,361 215,148 338,746 2.6 times
all banks 650,599 2,562,443 5,362,797 8.2 times
per bank 43,373 77,650 157,729 3.6 times
Source : PT Ekofin Konsulindo, "Indonesian Banking Indicator and Financial Performance
          31 December 1991 - 31 December 1999"(CD-ROM), Jakarta, 2000.
Compariso
n between
in 91 and
Forex
Bank
27 before1988
18 after1988
Non-forex
Bank
12 before1988
34 after1988
 
 
The following six groupings of banks will be compared: seven state-owned 
banks14, 27 old-forex banks, 18 new-forex banks, 12 old-non-forex banks, 34 new-non-
forex banks and 31 joint banks. The differences in management across the six groupings 
will be examined from the perspective of asset structure. But before that examination, the 
difference in scale among the groups is worth noting. Table-9 shows the percentage of 
                                                 
14 The seven state-owned banks are Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI), Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), the 
State Saving Bank (BTN), and the predecessors of Bank Mandiri: Bank Bumi Daya (BBD), Bank 
Dagang Negara (BDN), Bank Expor Impor (Bank Exim) and Indonesia development bank (Bapindo).  
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assets of each bank in the six groupings against the total assets of all commercial banks. 
State-owned banks and old forex banks together commanded around 80% of total assets 
of all commercial banks. Thus it must be understood that the behavior of both banks 
types has impacted upon the banking sector as a whole. 
 
Table9　Total Assets by Group of Banks* (%)
Dec-91 Dec-92 Dec-93 Dec-94 Dec-95 Dec-96 Dec-97 Dec-98 Dec-99
State owned bank** 63.0 62.1 59.2 54.7 50.5 46.1 43.2 47.5 46.4
Old forex bank 22.6 23.0 24.8 27.7 30.5 35.0 33.8 31.9 31.7
New forex bank 1.5 1.6 2.0 2.8 3.1 3.5 4.5 4.0 4.2
Old non-forex bank 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9
New non-forex bank 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.9
Joint Bank 5.2 5.6 5.8 6.5 6.8 6.6 7.8 8.2 5.5
Source : PT Ekofin Konsulindo, "Indonesian Banking Indicator and Financial Performance
          31 December 1991 - 31 December 1999"(CD-ROM), Jakarta, 2000.
Note* : Ratio of each group bank's total assets to all commercial banks' total assets, including 
             regional development banks and foreign banks.
Note** : Until 1988, state owned bank consisted of seven banks: Bapindo, BBD, BDN, EXIM, BNI, 
              BRI, BTN. In 1999. Currently there are four state owned banks: Mandiri, BNI, BRI, BTN.
 
 
3-1. Financial and Management Indicators by Bank Group 
 
A sound banking system consists of banks that have high profitability and 
adequate capital (Greuning at el [2000:76]). 
 
The following is an examination of the basic indicators of profitability, capital, 
and risk management. ‘Profitability’ indicates banks’ competitiveness and quality of 
management, ‘sufficiency of capital’ indicates banks’ safety and soundness, and `risk 
management’ is the most important feature of the lending practices of banks.  
 
(1) Return on Assets [ROA]: profits / total assets 
 
Return on Assets is a ratio of profit-to-total-asset, an important indicator of a company’s 
comprehensive profitability (Table-10). Comparing the average ROA of banks in the six 
groupings between 1991 and 1996, the highest average is the 4.3% of the old-non-forex 
banks. The lowest is the 0.7% of the state-owned banks. State-owned banks’ ROA was 
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less than 1% throughout the 1990s. This reveals that the state-owned banks’ profitability 
was low in proportion to their total assets. The new forex banks’ was lower still at 1.0%, 
whereas both the old-forex banks’ and the new-non-forex banks’ stood at 1.2 %. Joint 
banks’ was at 1.8%. 
 
Table 10 ROA (%)
Averag
e 91-96 Dec-91 Dec-92 Dec-93 Dec-94 Dec-95 Dec-96 Dec-97 Dec-98 Dec-99
State owned bank 0.7 0.51 0.43 0.51 0.75 0.79 0.93 0.44 -79.6 -18.9
Old forex bank 1.2 1.16 1.09 1.10 1.19 1.28 1.16 1.28 -24.9 -20.3
New forex bank 1.0 0.82 1.16 0.98 0.92 1.02 0.92 0.75 -38.6 -13.4
Old non forex bank 4.3 4.01 4.38 4.12 4.23 4.61 4.17 4.17 -119.1 -68.6
New non forex bank 1.2 1.12 1.79 1.52 1.39 0.81 0.40 1.47 -7.7 -2.4
Joint bank 1.8 2.39 2.02 1.77 1.12 1.58 1.67 0.91 -14.4 0.3
Average 2.0 2.00 2.17 2.00 1.92 2.02 1.85 1.81 -56.9 -24.7
Source : PT Ekofin Konsulindo, "Indonesian Banking Indicator and Financial Performance
          31 December 1991 - 31 December 1999"(CD-ROM), Jakarta, 2000.
Table 11 ROE (%)
Averag
e 91-96 Dec-91 Dec-92 Dec-93 Dec-94 Dec-95 Dec-96 Dec-97 Dec-98 Dec-99
State owned bank 10.4 12.6 7.2 9.4 9.7 11.9 11.9 6.8 110.2 448.1
Old forex bank 12.0 11.5 10.9 12.1 11.3 13.4 12.6 9.8 41.7 -12.6
New forex bank 7.1 4.8 6.5 6.9 7.2 8.6 8.7 5.2 69.5 -41.5
Old non forex bank 9.8 8.4 12.7 10.0 11.0 10.1 6.7 7.3 -41.1 -65.7
New non forex bank 5.2 3.3 5.8 7.1 8.0 4.5 2.5 7.2 -188.8 -102.7
Joint bank 10.6 10.5 12.2 11.1 7.7 11.1 11.3 5.0 132.2 44.3
Average 11.0 10.2 11.1 11.3 11.0 11.9 10.7 8.3 24.7 54.0
Source : PT Ekofin Konsulindo, "Indonesian Banking Indicator and Financial Performance
          31 December 1991 - 31 December 1999"(CD-ROM), Jakarta, 2000.
 
Okuda [2000: 199-208] compared the ROA of Thai and Philippine banks across 
three groupings: upper class bank, middle-class bank, and lower-class bank. According to 
that study, the Philippine upper class banks’ ROA in 1991 and 1994 was 2.9% and 2.3%, 
the middle-class banks’ 3.0% and 2.2%, and the lower-class banks’ 3.2% and 3.2%. The 
Thai upper-class banks’ was 1.5% and 2.5%, the middle-class banks’ 0.8% and 1.9%, the 
lower-class banks’ 0.6% and 1.1%. Among Indonesian banks, only the old non-forex 
banks’ and the joint banks’ profitability was higher than the Thai and Philippine banks’; 
the rest were lower. On the whole, profitability during the latter part of the 1990s tended 
to be lower than it was during the early years of that decade. 
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Table12 Profitability Ratio（Net Interest Profit/Earning Assets) (%)
Averag
e 91-96 Dec-91 Dec-92 Dec-93 Dec-94 Dec-95 Dec-96 Dec-97 Dec-98 Dec-99
State owned bank 2.5 1.9 1.5 2.5 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 -5.2 -6.0
Old forex bank 3.3 2.3 3.9 3.6 3.6 3.2 3.2 3.3 -12.1 -5.1
New forex bank 4.3 4.5 5.6 4.0 4.1 4.2 3.6 -0.3 -19.1 -13.8
Old non forex bank 5.6 1.1 6.6 7.3 7.6 5.5 5.5 6.5 10.4 6.6
New non forex bank 4.9 1.7 8.0 5.9 5.3 4.6 4.1 6.4 6.1 3.7
Joint bank 3.7 5.0 4.3 3.5 2.8 3.0 3.3 2.6 4.3 4.2
Average 4.9 3.3 6.0 5.4 5.3 4.7 4.5 4.2 -3.1 -2.1
Source : PT Ekofin Konsulindo, "Indonesian Banking Indicator and Financial Performance
          31 December 1991 - 31 December 1999"(CD-ROM), Jakarta, 2000.  
(2) Return of Equity [ROE]: net profits/ equity 
 
Return on Equity is as much a basic indicator of a bank’s profitability as is ROA (Table-
11). ROE is the ratio of net profit to capital. It is one of the indicators of profitability 
from the shareholder’s point of view. Between 1991 and 1996 the average ROE of old-
forex banks was the highest at 12%. Both state-owned banks and joint banks were at 
more than 10%, and the lowest, the new non-forex banks’, was at 5.2%. This was so 
because the state-owned banks’ and the forex banks’ capital was rather small, while the 
new non-forex banks’ was large. That is, the new-non-forex banks’ capital ratio (capital 
divided by total asset) was at an average of 33.5% from 1991 to 1996. This was higher 
than the state-owned banks’ capital ratio of 4%. 
 
(3) Profitability (net interest profits/earning assets) 
 
Banking profitability from the staple business, lending, can be represented as the ratio of 
`net interest profit from earnings assets’ to `total earnings assets’ (Table-12). The state-
owned banks’ profitability was the lowest. The old non-forex banks’ rose after 1992. 
Next to that the new-forex banks’ was also high. However, the new-forex banks’ net 
interest profit was already heading towards the negative in 1997. By 1998 three groups’ 
figures – the state-owned banks’, the old-forex and the new-forex banks’ – were in the 
negative, while non-forex banks still kept a rather high level. This difference is accounted 
for in terms of the difference in the volume of foreign currency assets and liabilities. That 
difference in volume shows that the impact of devaluation was the most severe on the 
state-owned banks and on the forex banks. 
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(4) Loan-to-Deposit Ratio [LDR]: total outstanding credit/total deposit 
 
LDR is a ratio of total lending to total deposit (Table-13). From the profitability 
perspective, high LDR is preferable, but from the risk perspective, too much lending 
against funding capacity or deposit is not desirable. State-owned banks’ LDR was as high 
as 106.6% on average. Joint banks’ was the highest at 164.3%. On the other hand, old-
forex banks’ and new-forex banks’ LDRs were rather low at 78.1% and 67.2 respectively, 
as were old-non-forex banks’ and new-non-forex banks’ at 56.5% and 57.5%. Especially 
during the first half of the 1990s, the non-forex banks’ LDR was very low at 30-40%. 
 
Table 13 LDR (%)
Averag
e 91-96 Dec-91 Dec-92 Dec-93 Dec-94 Dec-95 Dec-96 Dec-97 Dec-98 Dec-99
State owned bank 106.6 135.1 124.7 101.9 91.0 91.4 95.5 101.7 130.6 124.5
Old forex bank 78.1 81.2 73.8 73.7 82.7 79.5 77.6 81.5 47.4 22.1
New forex bank 67.2 53.6 65.7 65.1 76.1 73.3 69.4 82.6 -70.5 28.2
Old non forex bank 56.5 31.9 41.6 56.2 68.4 71.8 69.2 69.1 391.4 34.0
New non forex bank 57.5 40.1 44.9 56.4 67.3 67.1 68.9 69.7 38.1 35.4
Joint bank 164.3 150.9 164.5 165.6 156.5 178.9 169.6 200.5 288.6 88.7
Average 106.0 98.6 103.0 103.8 108.4 112.4 110.0 121.0 165.1 66.6
Source : PT Ekofin Konsulindo, "Indonesian Banking Indicator and Financial Performance
          31 December 1991 - 31 December 1999"(CD-ROM), Jakarta, 2000.
Table 14　Expenditure Ratio (%)
Averag
e 91-96 Dec-91 Dec-92 Dec-93 Dec-94 Dec-95 Dec-96 Dec-97 Dec-98 Dec-99
State owned bank 38.9 46.1 44.3 36.2 31.2 35.2 40.3 43.5 -18.1 -25.1
Old forex bank 34.6 34.4 35.7 36.3 35.3 34.4 31.3 28.4 -6.4 -18.9
New forex bank 35.6 36.4 33.6 39.8 34.2 32.8 36.7 -485.7 -5.7 -10.6
Old non forex bank 35.5 36.2 32.3 29.9 33.1 42.5 39.1 38.9 20.5 30.9
New non forex bank 28.7 21.8 27.2 27.8 28.7 30.7 35.7 28.4 30.8 44.9
Joint bank 17.8 13.1 15.3 19.5 22.2 18.5 18.4 18.1 13.0 15.7
Average 38.2 37.6 37.7 37.9 36.9 38.8 40.3 -65.7 6.9 7.4
Source : PT Ekofin Konsulindo, "Indonesian Banking Indicator and Financial Performance
          31 December 1991 - 31 December 1999"(CD-ROM), Jakarta, 2000.
 
 
(5) Expenditure Ratio (expense for personnel/ net interest profit) 
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Ratio of expense for personnel to net interest profit represents management efficiency 
(Table-14). The state-owned banks’ was high at 38.9% on average from 1991 to 1996, 
while the lowest was the joint banks’ at 17.8%. The new-non-forex banks’ was in the 
twenty-percent range, and both the forex-banks’ and the old-non-forex banks were in the 
thirty-percent range. Except the joint banks’, all other banks’ levels were almost the same. 
 
Table 15　Provision Ratio (%)
Averag
e 91-96 Dec-91 Dec-92 Dec-93 Dec-94 Dec-95 Dec-96 Dec-97 Dec-98 Dec-99
State owned bank 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.8 3.7 2.4 2.2 2.4 39.1 30.5
Old forex bank 1.5 1.1 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.0 35.6 20.9
New forex bank 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.1 2.2 33.9 14.5
Old non forex bank 1.3 0.7 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.3 1.4 1.5 10.5 4.6
New non forex bank 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.9 2.4 18.7 9.0
Joint bank 2.4 2.3 3.0 2.7 2.2 2.0 2.3 3.7 24.6 27.1
Average 2.2 1.9 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.8 32.5 21.3
Source : PT Ekofin Konsulindo, "Indonesian Banking Indicator and Financial Performance
          31 December 1991 - 31 December 1999"(CD-ROM), Jakarta, 2000.
 
(6) Provision Ratio (provision/total lending) 
 
Provision ratio to total lending is one of the indicators of risk management (Table15). The 
state-owned banks’ was at 3.1%, and the joint banks’ at 2.4%, while both of forex and 
non-forex banks’ were at the low level of 0.9-1.6%. In 1995 and 1996 all banks’ figures 
were falling because in those years default risk tended not to be measured against rapid 
increase in lending. After the crisis, the state-owned banks’ provisional ratio became high 
at 39.1%, and the other banks’ also rose to level at 20-30%. Because of the crisis, the 
problem of non-performing loan came to the surface, and all banks were required to 
accumulate provision against default risk. 
 
3-2. Asset Portfolio and Funding by Banking Groups 
 
(1) Changes in Asset Portfolio 
 
One of the most important functions in banking is the intermediary. Banks collect short-
term funds and lend them to primary borrowers through several mechanisms like 
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conversion of term, reduction of risk, reduction of administrative costs, and so on. This 
section, of which the main concern is the bank-asset portfolio, will investigate to which 
sectors banks tend to lend and how they invest their funds other than as loans. Several 
factors – such as the level of deposits with other banks, the value of outstanding 
marketable-securities holding, the existence of loans to related companies, the volume of 
third-party loans, and the level of investment in stocks in relation to total assets – are used 
as measures of analysis. 
 
Figure 5 Changes in Asset portfolio,1991～1999* 
Figure 5-1 Lending to Third Party
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After the crisis, the large volume of group lending was criticized. Figure 5-1 
shows the ratio of third party lending15 to total assets. In the early 1990s, bank lending 
volume registered on two levels: new non-forex banks’ and joint banks’ ratios were at 
around 50%, and other banks’ at 70%. Before the crisis almost all banks were on the 
same level at around 65-75%. However, after the crisis, lending behavior towards third 
parties differentiated as two trends. The state-owned banks’ level was at 72.9% in 1997 
but increased to 89.4% in 1998. The joint banks’ also increased to 73% in 1998 from 
                                                 
15 The Debtor and Fund Resource Bank recognized two categories: `related company’ and `third 
party’. According to the Indonesian Accounting Association’s Standard Finance Accounting No 7 – 
Peryataan Standar Akuntansim Keuangan No.7, (Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia (1999) – a `related 
company’ is a ‘subsidiary’ if a bank is its dominant stake-holder owning more than 50% of its shares, 
or it is an ‘affiliate’ with which a bank cooperates in matters to do with capital or human capital. A 
`third party’ is any entity other than a related company. 
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68.3% in 1997. On the other hand, other banks reduced third-party lending in 1998: old-
forex banks’ reduced to 49.2% from 72.2% and old non-forex banks’ reduced by half 
from 65.4% to 32.9%. 
Figure 5-2 Lending to the Related Company
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Figure 5-3  Marketable Securities
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Alongside the decrease in their third-party lending, old forex-banks increased 
lending to related companies from 1.2% to 24.4% (Figure5-2), while old non-forex banks 
increased marketable securities holding and deposits with other banks (Figure 5-3, 5-5). 
During the 1990s both these banking groups kept stable levels in their marketable 
securities holdings, but after the crisis all banks except state-owned banks increased their 
marketable securities stake in response to the very tight monetary policy. In mid-1998, 
since the interest rate on the one-month Central Bank Certificate (Sertifikat Bank 
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Indonesia: SBI) rose to around 70% per annum, banks shifted their investment from 
lending to safety assets such as SBI. 
Figure 5-4 Stock Investment
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Figure5-5 Deposit with Other Banks
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Source: PT Ekofin Konsulindo, "Indonesian Banking Indicator and Financial performance 31 
December 1991 - 31 December 1999"(CD-ROM), Jakarta, 2000. 
Note: Indicators are ratio to total assets. 
 
Old forex banks, which rapidly increased lending to related companies in 1998, 
decreased to 3% in 1999, and at the same time, increased investment in stock to 35.2% 
(Figure5-4). New non-forex banks deposited a certain amount of funds, around 20%-30% 
of total assets, to other banks. This level was higher than other banks’. Joint banks 
36.0 
35.0 
*
IDE Research Paper No. 6, September 2003 
37 
deposited around 20% of total assets to other banks, and then reduced it to 10% of total 
assets (Figure5-5). After the crisis almost all banks increased deposits with other banks. 
Both old and new non-forex banks increased the level of these deposits to 33%. These 
changes were expedited by high interest rates and by banks’ preferring better safety and 
more stable investment to the risks of lending. 
 
Figure 6 Changes in liability and equity by Group of banks, 1991～1999* 
Figure 6-1 Capital Ratio
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(2) Changes in capital ratio  
 
Capital ratio, which is capital divided by total asset (Figure-6-1), in state-owned banks 
was at 4%-5%, in old forex and old non-forex bank at around 7%, while in new forex and 
joint bans at 12%, new non-forex banks it remained a high level at more than 20%. After 
the crisis, all banks’ capital was heavily damaged. The state-owned banks’ and the forex 
bank’s capital was particularly seriously reduced. Increase in non-performing loans and 
the deep devaluation of the rupiah resulted in negative capital. On the other hand, old and 
new non-forex banks kept their capital, thanks to the low levels of their asset and liability 
in foreign currency. 
 
(3) How banks raise funds 
 
Ratio of issuance of securities, third-party funds (which exclude funds from related 
companies), time deposits from related companies, and borrowing to total liability are 
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examined with the purpose of isolating the major ways in which banks raise funds. Old 
non-forex banks and state-owned banks have a high ratio of funds raised by issuance of 
securities after 1994 (Figure 6-2). The ratio of funds raised by third-parties as main 
resource, joint banks’ at around 20% and state-owned banks’ at 50-60% (Figure 6-3).  
Borrowing, another measure of raising funds, was kept at 50% by the joint 
banks, and at around 30% (also a high level) by the state-owned bank. These high 
borrowing ratios show that these banks commanded high levels of trust on the money 
market. Creditworthiness is an important element of the capacity to raise funds. In that 
sense, the state-owned banks’ average ratio of 31.5% and the joint banks’ ratio of 35.4%, 
much higher than the old non-forex banks’ of 7.1% and the old forex banks’ of 8%, 
reveal that the market considered the state-owned banks and the joint banks more 
creditworthy than the other banks. 
Figure 6-2 Marketable Securities (Liability)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
（％）
State owned bank
Old forex bank
New forex bank
Old non forex bank
New non forex bank
Joint bank
 
The ratio of time deposit from related companies to total liabilities (Figure-6-5) 
increased in the new forex banks and in the new non-forex banks after 1994. It is said that 
a strong relationship between banks and related companies is evident in group lending. 
However, in the light of published data, it is said also that banks play some role in 
collecting funds from related companies and in investing them. That role is peculiar to 
new banks.  
IDE Research Paper No. 6, September 2003 
39 
Figure 6-3Funds from the Third Party
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Figure 6-4 Borrowing
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Figure 6-5 Time Deposit from the Related Company
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Source: PT Ekofin Konsulindo, "Indonesian Banking Indicator and Financial performance 31 
December 1991 - 31 December 1999"(CD-ROM), Jakarta, 2000. 
Note*: Capital ratio is a ratio of equity capital to total assets, not CAR. Liability indicator is a 
ratio total liability. 
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3-4. Summary of Analysis in Financial Indicator 
 
When banks are organized in accordance with their establishment dates as `before’ and 
`after’ 1988, the number of the banks that failed during the crisis is almost same in two 
groups; before and after 1988. Thus it is difficult to assert that that there is a clear 
correlation between the deterioration of banking management and a bank’s 
`establishment’ dates. Differences in the size of banks’ assets provide better scope for 
discerning correlations. The average total asset of new banks is only one-seventh of that 
of the old banks. It is can be said that small banks proliferated after 1988. And new banks 
had rather larger holdings of equity capital in proportion to their total assets than did the 
old banks: the new non-forex banks’ capital ratio was kept at more that 20%. However, 
large equity capital does not necessarily imply sound management. Where deposits from 
related companies’ account for the large percentage of total liabilities, there may still be a 
lack of ability to absorb third-party funds. Difference in size shows little disparity 
between old and new banks, but a distinct disparity is contingent upon a bank’s being a 
forex bank or non-forex bank. 
As already mentioned at the begging of this section, 80% of the commercial 
banking sector in Indonesia is dominated by state-owned banks and old forex banks. 
These banks, which represent the Indonesian banking sector, have similar characteristics 
such as large asset holdings, and in comparison with other banks, relatively small equity 
capital and relatively low profitability. As the state-owned banks’ ratio of cost is the 
highest, their management effectiveness is lower than other banks’. Nevertheless, both 
state-owned and old forex banks keep high loan-deposit ratios. These factors reveal that 
state-owned banks, which have been the center of the Indonesian financial system, and 
old forex banks, which have complemented state-owned banks, have had central roles as 
intermediaries. There are some indications that over-lending is a normal situation in 
Indonesia (Okuda, 2000:223). Although the joint banks, where the average LDR is 164%, 
are exceptions, even state-owned banks have an LDR of around 100%, and the others are 
not far below at 100%. The data in this section suggests that over-lending is not a 
remarkable tendency. 
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When a bank disburses a loan, a risk-management assessment must accompany 
it. However, the low provision rate shows that risk management was not widely practiced 
before the crisis. When awareness of the risk associated with lending was low, state-
owned banks prepared higher relative provisions than did other banks. Because it was 
pointed out that state-owned banks’ credit had become non-performing since the 
beginning of the 1990s, state-owned banks’ provision was set at a higher level. 
During the 1990s, the addition of the new forex banks to the existing state- 
owned and old forex banks contributed to the expansion of the Indonesian banking sector. 
New forex banks had been expanding since 1994. They are characterized by low ROA 
and ROE, but by high capital ratio compared to that of state-owned and old forex banks. 
Their profitability is also higher, but their provision ratio is the lowest. This shows that 
risk management did not accompany the rapid process of expansion. 
Because non-forex banks service small companies or individuals with smaller 
credit demand, their function might be different from that of state-owned and forex banks. 
The features of non-forex banks, both old and new, are large equity capital and high 
profitability. Indicators show them to be `excellent` banks. Although the number of non-
forex banks accounts for 30% of the total number of banks, the total asset of both old and 
new non-forex bank accounts for only 2% of total assets of all commercial banks. They 
are very small banks (Table-9). Their ratio of third-party fund to total liability is around 
80%, but their LDR is low, and their portion of deposit to other banks is large. There is a 
big difference in the measure of investment between them and the state-owned or forex 
banks. New non-forex banks have an especially high ratio of time deposit from related 
companies, and a low ratio of third-party lending. Therefore they have little intermediary 
function. 
Before the crisis, banks’ group lending mounted to 70%-90% of total lending.16 
This large group lending become a big problems in the Indonesian banking sector, but 
according to published data, almost 70%-80% of bank lending is third-party lending. 
However, during the crisis many banks reduced their third-party loans and increased 
credit to related companies. The forex banks in particular rapidly (though temporarily) 
increased loans to related companies. A portion which decreased in third-party lending 
was divided not only to related companies but also to safety assets like SBI or to deposit 
                                                 
16 29 September, 1998, Jakarta Post 
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to other banks. So except for a short period in 1998, it is difficult to point to a plethora of 
group lending17. 
On the one hand private banks changed their lending behavior to cope with the 
crisis, and on the other hand state owned banks increased third-party credit. This reveals 
that after the crisis the role of the state-owned banks became big, and there was even the 
temporary phenomenon of a return to pre-liberalization times. State-owned banks, which 
have regained the dominant position, have a low profitability and a high expenditure ratio 
compared with other banks’. Since the current Indonesian banking sector is influenced by 
the state-owned banks’ performance, those banks are well advised to improve the 
efficiency of their management and to strengthen the soundness of their balance sheets.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper examined the development and transformation of the Indonesia financial 
sector, with particular attention to its banking sector, and it presented the following 
findings: 
Since the formative period of the financial structure at the beginning of the 
Soeharto era and through to the period of policy-based finance under soaring oil prices, 
the Indonesian banking system, in which the Central Bank and the state-owned banks had 
always been the main players, functioned as distributor of government fiscal funds. This 
situation and the structure were radically altered by the financial reforms of 1983 and 
1988. These reforms developed the financial sector, and private national banks became 
prominent players in the system. On the basis of this, the Indonesian financial system 
came to be regarded as an effective market modeled on the competitive principle. 
However, the currency crisis of 1997 damaged bank assets deeply, and many private 
national banks were closed or nationalized, with the result that state-owned banks 
regained their dominant position in Indonesian banking sector. 
Also examined, in the light of post-1990 financial indicators, were the 
differences in management and portfolio structure across several groupings of banks. It 
                                                 
17 As the data used in this section cannot specify the way of banks’ appropriation of lending to related 
companies, it cannot be denied that the data does not reflect the reality of group lending. 
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was argued that the rush to establish new banks during the second reform in 1988 caused 
the Indonesian banking system to become fragile. It was noted, however, that on 
comparing banks in terms of establishment times `before’ and `after’ 1988, it is difficult 
to discern a clear correlation between `before’ and `after’ establishment times and 
deterioration in the effectiveness of management. Rather, the big discrepancy that was 
noted between banks is in their total-asset sizes. Some indicators showed that the state-
owned banks and the old forex banks controlled around 80% of the total assets of all 
banks, and that they had a high Loan Deposit Ratio [LDR]. These banks had played a 
central role in intermediation. Non-forex banks were found to be excellent banks on the 
grounds that they have a high capital ratio and a high profit ratio. Nevertheless, they are 
very small banks and contribute little in the way of intermediary function.  
The large volume of group lending constituted a very big problem in Indonesia. 
However, on the evidence of published data, most of that lending is in the form of third-
party loans. After the crisis banks increased lending to their related companies and shifted 
their investment to safety assets. Many shifted funds back to state-owned banks or to 
foreign banks in a ‘flight to safety’. Thus the state-owned banks regained their main-
player positions in the banking sector.  
Disorder in the financial sector affects its national economy. Since non-
performing loans aggravate an already-harmed economy, it is difficult to settle the 
problem instantly. However, the resolution of the non-performing loans problem and the 
resumption of extending credit to the real sector are the necessary preconditions to 
economic recover. In the present time, the Indonesian banking sector is in a process of 
restructuring. First, it needs to sweep away the damage done by the macro-shock of the 
currency crisis. The crisis identified some inherent systemic problems in the 
implementation of prudential regulations, in supervising capability and in the accounting 
and legal system. These problems must be resolved, at the same time the conventional 
financial system has to be reviewed with a view to bringing it in line with the 
globalization. 
The Indonesian financial sector continues to be beset by problems. Re-
capitalization at the end of 2000 provided urgently-needed remediation. The main issue 
of 2001 was the self-reliant reorganization by banks themselves. However, 2001 saw also 
the extending of credit that remained inactive. One of the causes of this was an IMF-
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imposed condition that constrained banks’ lending behavior: they faced closure or merger 
if their CAR failed to reach 8% by the end of 2001. Indeed, some banks were closed or 
merged at the end of 2001. 
These closures and mergers were aimed to improve banking soundness. Four 
state-owned banks were merged to form a large bank, the Bank Mandiri, which 
dominated 30% of total assets of all commercial banks. However, its effect on the 
Indonesian banking sector is yet to be assessed. Although the banking sector was 
significantly changed by closures and mergers, it is too early to evaluate the success of 
this action. 
The matters that must be solved are obvious. They include the need to improve 
the effectiveness of day-to-day banking practice, the need to acquire competent risk-
assessment and loan screening skills, the need to maintain sound balance sheets, and the 
need to improve transparency. The importance of accountability and transparency of 
management are now gaining recognition. The onus of making continuous effort to 
restructure is not upon banks only but also upon corporations and the government.  
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